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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JARED LOOSER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, THE STATE INSURANCE
FUND and SPORTS CARS INCORPORATED,

Case No.
8972

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We agree with the first sentence in the Plaintiff's
Brief, namely the happening of the accident and the injury
of plaintiff on May 25, 1957. But we think that most of
the other purported statements of the facts, as set out in
his attorneys' brief, are not complete and correct. For example, the second sentence in the brief (page 1), that
"plaintiff was employed as a mechanic and test driver by
the defendant, Sports Cars Incorporated," is only partially
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correct. Plaintiff was emloyed as a mechanic. He was not
employed as a test driver. Their Statement of Facts has
many inferences and arguments intermixed with the facts
and several of the stated facts are only partially correct.'
We therefore feel that we must here make a brief statement
of the essential facts, without any inferences or arguments.
Jared Looser, the plaintiff, was in the employ of Sports
Cars Incorporated as a mechanic. During the months of
April and May 1957, there was considerable conversation
on the premises of Sports Cars Incorporated among employees of that company, relating to the sports car races which
were going to be run during the latter part of May and the
first part of June, 1957. From the transcript of testimony
of the Industrial Commission's hearing of May 26, 1958, it
is quite apparent that the witnesses could not all remember
in exactly the same way, how many conversations there
were or the exact words of each person. Some of these conversations culminated in an arrangement whereby Jared
Looser and Vaughn Funk drove the MG from Salt Lake
City to LaJunta, Colorado on May 24, 1957 to participate
as contestants in the races which were to be held at LaJunta
on May 25 and 26, under the auspices of Sports Car Club
of America. This MG was a used car which was owned by
Sports Cars Incorporated and had been assigned to Vaughn
Funk as a demonstrator in his work as salesman for the
company. Mr. Funk held the position of Secretary of the
company and salesman. He was not connected with the
mechanical part of the business. He was interested in sports
car racing as a hobby. Pursuant to a conversation in the
shop one day between Jared Looser and Vaughn Funk, it
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was agreed that Jared Looser would put in his own time
preparing this car for the LaJunta races; then both Looser
and Funk would drive it in the races. At their request Mr.
Schettler, the president of the company, agreed that the
company would pay for the parts that were necessary to
prepare the car for the races. Looser and Funk each paid
his own entrance fee of $7.50. Looser put in 50 hours. of
his own time working on the car. Funk helped a little. Funk
paid for the gasoline and oil out of his own pocket. Each
of them paid for their own meals on the trip. While driving
the car in a practice run prior to the races, Jared Looser
was injured.
The Industrial Commission held a hearing relating to
Jared Looser's application for compensation. On August
1, 1958 the Commission rendered its decision in which it
denied his application. Plaintiff and his attorneys have
brought the matter to ths Court for review.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT
JARED LOOSER'S ACCIDENT OF MAY 25
'
1957, AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
POINT II.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID MAKE
WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
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POINT III.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO GRANT APPLICANT'S REQUEST FOR A REHEARING.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT
JARED LOOSER'S ACCIDENT OF MAY 25,
1957, AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
It is now well settled that in an Industrial Commission

case the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish
a claim for compensation. Grasteit vs. Ind. Comm., 76 Utah
487, 290 Pac. 764, Wherritt vs. Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 68,
110 Pac. (2nd) 374, General Mills, Inc. vs. Ind. Comm., 101
Utah 214, 120 Pac. (2nd) 379.
We think that the Supreme Court of Utah has already
settled the law relating to factual situations such as that
which existed in the case at bar. In Auerbach Company
vs. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 195 Pac. (2nd)
245, the injured person, Rela Wardle was in the employ
of Auerbach Company as a cashier. She also played basketball, being a member of a team sponsored by the Company
as a part of their public relations and advertising program.
She had not been hired as a basketball player. She was
paid only as a cashier. The expenses of herself and all the
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other members of the team, were paid during their trips
to play basketball. Miss Wardle played on the basketball
team because she wanted to, and not because she was required to do so. Some of the players were in the employ of
Auerbach Company, and some were not. Any income from
the games went to the Company, but in amount it was
hardly sufficient to keep up with the team expenses. The
control of the team was in the hands of the public relations
officer of the Company. Rela Wardle was injured at night
while she was riding in an automobile going to Provo to
play a game. The car was being driven by a Miss Green,
who was not an employee of Auerbach's, but the Company
was furnishing the gasoline for the trip.
After a hearing, the Industrial Commission held that
Miss Wardle was in the course of her employment and
awarded compensation. By a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Utah ·annulled the award. In the Court's
main opinion and in the two concurring opinions, it was
held that one of the most important elements of the employer-employee relationship was missing, namely "the right
to control." Justice Pratt said,
"Right to control in this case does not mean
merely coaching control, the purpose of which is to
produce team work when the alleged employee plays;
but means the right to require performance of a
duty to play, if such a duty exists."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Wade said,
"The company encouraged the girls to play
basketball, it furnished certain expenses including
transportation, its department of public relations
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arranged some of the games and some of the details
connected therewith, it collected the gate receipts
and obtained certain advertisement advantages from
the games. In my opinion this is not sufficient from
which a contract of employment vesting in the company the right of control over the members of this
team can reasonably be inferred."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Wolfe said,
"The test of the employer-employee relationship
is not whether or not the purported employer is benefited by the actions of the purported employee. A
person or business organization may be materially
benefited by an independent contractor, or by a volunteer. It is obvious that regardless of whether or
not the prime motive in sponsoring a team is to reap
the benefits of the advertising thereby attained, all
sponsors will receive, either as a direct or incidental
benefit, advertising benefits to the extent that games
played by their teams are patronized by the 'fans,'
and to the extent that results and reports of such
games are publicized in the newspapers and on the
radio. But whether the chief purpose of the sponsor
is advertising, or some more philanthropic motive, I
regard as immaterial here. As noted in the prevailing opinion, the fundamental test of employer-employee relationship is right of control. And where
the player plays voluntarily, of his own choice, during his off-duty hours, and is free to play or not to
play as he determines of his own choice, it cannot
be said that the sponsor has the right of control
which makes it an employer and the player an employee, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act."
There have been two cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Utah involving the question of whether racing car
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drivers were in the status of employees, namely Intermountain Speedways, Inc. vs. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah
573, 126 Pac. (2nd) 22, and another case having the same
title, at 102 Utah 126, 127 Pac. (2nd) 1045. The majority
opinion of the Court held that the racing car drivers were
not employees of the company which operated the races.
This, of course, was a diffe-rent question than is involved
in the case at bar. Most of the Court's discussion of the
points involved, is contained in the opinion of the first of
the two cases at 101 Utah 573. The Court discussed certain
tests which must be applied to any situation to determine
whether the relationship of "employer-employee" exists,
such as:
( 1)

The method of payment.

(2)

Nature of the work.

(3)

Whether for a definite piece of work.

But the Court's opinion held that the one test which is more
important than the others is the "right to control as to
means and method of performance." The Court's opinion
further stated (p. 578-579) that
"Speedways had no right to control Winters as
to the means or method of performance in the race.

* * * The deceased in this case did not bear the
relation of employee to Intermountain Speedways.
He was a contestant with other contestants."
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POINT II.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID MAKE
WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Plaintiff's attorneys have charged that the Industrial
Commission failed to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law in writing, as is required by Section 35-1-85, U. C. A.
1953. The Industrial Commission did make its findings of
fact and its conclusions of law in writing. In its Decision
dated August 1, 1958, the Commission first specified the
formal and preliminary matters in the title and in the first
three paragraphs. Then, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are set out in the next four paragraphs as
follows:
"Applicant was employed as a mechanic by
Sports Cars Incorporated. He had not been separated
from the payroll at the time the accident occurred.
However, it does not follow that the activity in which
applicant was engaged at the time of the accident
was in his capacity of employee.
"Mr. Schettler, president of defendant corporation, on request of applicant and Funk, consented
that a company car could be conditioned for races
at LaJunta, Colorado, if applicant and Funk, perhaps others, did all the work free of charge. Sports
Car Incorporated would supply the necessary parts
free of charge. Neither applicant nor Funk received
wages from the time they left Salt Lake City until
their return. Each paid his own living expenses and
the gas and oil. There is no evidence to support a
finding that Sports Car Incorporated had the right
to control applicant after he left Salt Lake City and
until his return. No doubt Schettler could have re-
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fused to let applicant and Funk use the car but that
is not the kind of control with which we are con\
cerned.
"We are persuaded to hold that both applicant
and Funk were on a mission of their own choosing
as contestants to obtain experience in racing and for
their own enjoyment. Such relationship as may have
existed between applicant, Funk and Sports Cars
Incorporated, could be called a joint enterprise, but
not an employer-employee relationship. Defendant
corporation supplied the car and the necessary parts
free of charge. Applicant and Funk supplied the
labor free of charge. Defendant corporation possibly
received some advertising value. Applicant and Funk
obtained race driving experience and enjoyment.
"In any event, whether applicant and Funk were
on a mission of their own or engaged in a joint enterprise with defendant corporation, we must find
that the accident did not arise out of or in the course
of applicant's employment by defendant corporation."
It is true that the Industrial Commission did not label
the FINDINGS OF FACT by putting those three words in
the middle of the page immediately preceding the fourth
paragraph of the Decision, as is usually done in the papers
filed in the District Court in a civil case prior to entering
a Judgment. But there is no requirement in Section 35-1-85
that the findings of fact or the conclusions of law must be
in any particular form or be specifically designated with
those titles prior to the issuance of the Decision or in the
Decision itself. We are also aware that the Commission
included a few surplus words in its. findings and conclusions,
particularly in giving its reasons for so finding or so con-
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eluding. But the provision in Section 35-1-85 does not prohibit the Commissiom from giving its reasons for arriving
at certain conclusions.
Stripped of surplus words, the Commission's findings
of fact were that
(1)

Jared Looser regularly was in the employ of Defendant, Sports Cars, Inc., as a mechanic;

(2)

the corporation's president Schettler allowed a
company car to be conditioned for races at
LaJ unta, under arrangements whereby the company supplied the necessary parts and the men
supplied the labor;

( 3)

Looser and Funk did not receive wages from the
time of leaving Salt Lake City until their return;

( 4)

each of them paid his own expenses;

( 5)

the corporation did not have the right to control
Looser after he left Salt Lake City ;

(6)

at the time of his accident Looser did not have
the relationship of employee;

(7)

Looser and Funk supplied their labor and they
received driving experience and enjoyment;

(8)

the corporation possibly received some advertising
value.

The Commission's conclusion of law was that the
accident did not arise out of or in the course of Looser's
employment. Those findings and conclusions are quite clear
and are complete.
There have been very few cases in which the Supreme
Court of Utah has discussed the requirement of Section
35-1-85, U. C. A. 1953, that the Industrial Commission shall
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make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, since
that provision was enacted by the 1949 Legislature. But
this Court has on previous occasions ruled on the requirement that the District Courts make findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

In re Clift's Estate, 70 Utah 409, 290 Pac. 859, this
Court held that even though the District Court's findings
are not in artistic form according to approved models, but
they clearly indicate the mind of the trial court, the Supreme Court will hold without merit the assignments of
error as to such findings.
In the case of Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. vs.
Kay, 81 Utah 595, 21 Pac. (2nd) 836, the following syllabi

are instructive:
( 5)

In making findings Court must find on all material issues.

( 6)

Findings are required only as to ultimate facts,
not necessarily as to all specifically alleged facts
involved in findings of ultimate facts.

( 8)

Statutory requirement that facts found and conclusions of law be separately stated is merely directory.

(10)

Finding, though stated among conclusions of
law, may be regarded as finding of ultimate fact.

In the 1933 case of Thompson vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah
247, 23 Pac. (2nd) 930, the Supreme Court held that an
Industrial Commission finding that "the applicant failed
to sustain his burden of proof by competent evidence that
injury was the result of accident in course of his employ-
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ment," was equivalent to a finding that applicant did not
sustain an injury by accident arising out of or in course
of his employment.
In the more recent case of Smith vs. Industrial Commission, 5 Utah (2nd) 50, 296 Pac. (2nd) 511, Roland B.
Smith was killed in the crash of a private airplane on April
19, 1954. He was a general partner in a partnership business known as Smith Sales Company, which sold the products of four corporations which packed or canned foods.
Mr. Smith was an officer of each of those corporations.
The partnership had no workmen's compensation insurance
coverage. The corporations had coverage. A claim was
made by Mr. Smith's dependents against the corporations
and their insurance carrier. After a hearing, the Industrial
Commission denied the claim. One of the Commission's
findings was that at the time of his death Smith was engaged in his capacity of a general partner in the Smith Sales
Company. The Commission further stated "It necessarily
must follow that the trip was for and on behalf of the partnership * * *"
The Supreme Court of Utah sustained the Industrial
Commission's order. The Court held that there was ample
evidence to support the Commission's finding that Smith
"was engaged in his capacity of general partner." Plaintiffs' attorneys contended that the findings were incomplete in that the Commission failed to make a finding that
Smith was not at the time in question representing one or
more of the corporations. The Court's opinion said,
"It was not his duty as representative of any
corporation to promote sales; that was his duty as
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a general partner. * * * It would seem that a
positive finding that Smith was representing the
partnership would under the facts in this case necessarily preclude a finding that he was also engaged
in corporate work. It would be clearer had the Commission spelled out the negative-that Smith was
not representing any of the corporations on this trip.
The affirmative finding that he was engaged in his
capacity of a general partner of Smith Sales Company carries with it the conclusion that he was not
engaged in his capacity of an employee or officer of
one or more of the corporations. * * * The
order of the Commission could only follow their conclusion that the finding that Smith was engaged in
his capacity of general partner in the Smith Sales
Company was a finding that he was not engaged in
his capacity of corporate employee or officer."
Section 35-1-88 of the Workmen's Compensation Law
reads:
"The commission shall not be bound by the usual
common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any
technical or formal rules of procedure, other than
as herein provided; but may make its investigations
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and
to carry out justly the spirit of this title."
In the case of Spencer vs. Ind. Comm., 81 Utah 511, 20
Pac. (2nd) 618, there was considerable discussion about
the Industrial Commission's procedure. The Supreme
Court's opinion contains the following:
"A broad discretion is vested in the Indus trial
Commission by statute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec.
3149) with respect to the manner in which its investigations shall be conducted. Unless it is shown
that some substantial right of a party has been de-
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nied him, or that he has been deprived of an opportunity to fairly and fully develop his case, this court
will not interfere to direct the method of conducting
such hearings or investigations. (Ocean Ace. &
Guar. Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 66 Utah 600, 245 Pac.
343.)"
In our present case, Jared Looser had been hired by
Sports Cars, Inc., as a mechanic and worked as a mechanic.
He was not hired to engage in races. He had never entered
or driven in a race before. He voluntarily put in 50 hours
of work on his own time preparing the car for the race
because he expected to get some fun or enjoyment out of
going to and participating in the races as a driver. His
employer did not instruct or direct him with respect to his
trip or his driving.
Vaughn Funk also was in the same status at LaJunta
as was Mr. Looser. He told Looser on one occasion that
he should slow down so as not to give their competitors any
secret about their speed capabilities. Mr. Funk was merely
giving his fellow contestant some advice. He was more experienced than Looser. Mr. Funk might even be considered
as being in the category of "coach" of the team consisting
of Funk & Looser. His suggestion to Looser to slow down
was more in the nature of advice than it was supervision.
POINT III.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO GRANT APPLICANT'S REQUEST FOR A REHEARING.
The only necessary words which were contained in the
Industrial Commission's Order dated September 30, 1958

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
were the last sentence in which it was "ORDERED that
the Application for Rehearing is hereby denied."
Section 35-1-82, U. C. A. 1953, provides that any party
may apply to the Industrial Commission for a rehearing
within 30 days after the Commission's decision. But neither
this section nor Section 35-1-83 specify the wording or
form of the order whereby the Commission denies the application for rehearing. Neither these sections of the statute nor any ruling by the Utah Supreme Court of which
we are cognizant, say anything more than that the Commission denies the application for rehearing. In the present
case the Industrial Commission gave its reasons for denying the application for rehearing, mainly that the Commission had not been persuaded by the contents of the first
Application for Rehearing nor of the First or Second Supplements which were filed by applicant's attorneys, that
the applicant was entitled to a rehearing.
There is no provision in the Workmen's Compensation
Act, nor in any other statutory or judicial rules, which required the Industrial Commission to grant a rehearing
under circumstances such as those existing in this case at
the time the Industrial Commission made its Order of
September 30, 1958. In the preliminary material in that
Order, the Industrial Commission mentioned that there is
no provision in law for the filing of any Supplements to the
application for rehearing. But in denying said application,
the Commission's Order of September 30, 1958 showed that
the Commission had given consideration to the material
contained in the Supplements, as well as the material in the
Petition for Rehearing.
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There have been several Utah Supeme Court cases
which mentioned that the Industrial Commission has the
discretionary power to grant or deny a rehearing. In the
case of Callahan vs. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 256,
139 Pac. (2nd) 214, Marlow Callahan was given a hearing
by the Industrial Commission, which then denied compensation on the basis that he had not sustained "an accident,
resulting in a hernia, arising out of or in the course of his
employment." On July 13, 1942 applicant filed an application for rehearing on the basis of alleged "newly discovered evidence." On July 16, 1942 the Commission denied
this application for rehearing. On August 13, 1942 applicant filed with the Industrial Commission a "Supplemental
Application for Rehearing," with three affidavits attached,
one by himself, one by his attending physician and one by
a fellow employee. The Industrial Commission took no action regarding the "Supplemental Application." The applicant took the case to the Utah Supreme Court for review.
The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Industrial Commission's decision. The Court's opinion said,
"This Supplemental Application was simply a second application for rehearing, for which there is no authority in
law. The statute above quoted is jurisdictional, and the
Commission was warranted in disregarding this untimely
"Supplemental Application." With respect to the Industrial
Commission's discretion relating to the application for rehearing, the Court's opinion said
"Regardless of whether we might feel that, under the unfortunate circumstances of plaintiff appearing at the hearing without counsel or other
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representation, and being unprepared to properly
present his case at that time, the showing made
through counsel by his application for a rehearing
for a more thorough examination of available evidence, the Commission found as a fact on the conflicting testimony in the record that plaintiff 'did
not sustain an accident, resulting in a hernia, arising
out of or in the course of his employment.' The
Commision having so acted, on substantial, competent evidence, we cannot say as a matter of law that
the decision should have been otherwise. This principle has been repeatedly announced in Industrial
Commission cases."
With respect to the allegation of plaintiff's attorneys
that the Industrial Commission refused to grant their
Motion to be allowed time to file a Memorandum countering
the Memorandum which Defendants' attorney had filed
with the Industrial Commission on September 29, 1958:
The Commission's Order denying the application for
rehearing, was dated September 30, 1958. That was before
the Commission received the Motion of plaintiff's attorneys
on October 1, 1958.
As with several other matters of the procedure involved
in this case, there is no statutory provision relating to any
memorandum or briefs which may be filed with the Industrial Commission by either party to a proceeding pending
before the Commission. Of course, the purpose any party
has in filing such a memorandum is to persuade the Commission to make a decision or ruling in favor of such party.
There is no requirement that the Industrial Commission
shall grant or specify a period for any party to file an argu-
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ment relating to a case the Commission may be considering.
We do know that as a customary practice the Industrial
Commission always has received written arguments from
parties who have filed them in a reasonable time, and has
given due consideration to them. After the Industrial Commission rendered its Decision in this case on August 1,
1958, the Applicant's attorneys filed first, an Application
for Rehearing, then a Supplement to Pending Application
for Rehearing. Both of those documents contained several
allegations and points of argument. They were as much
in the nature of a brief or memorandum as if they had
been so labeled. We felt that it was only fitting and proper
to file a memorandum with the Industrial Commission in
the nature of argument against the arguments which the
applicant's attorneys had already filed, lest we give the
impression (by remaining silent) that we agreed with applicant's attorneys' arguments.
We do not understand why plaintiff's attorneys (at
page 25 of their brief), cited the case of Kent vs. Ind. Comm.,
89 Utah 381, 57 Pac. (2nd) 724. It does not support their
arguments. In that case Charles Kent applied to the Industrial Commission, which after a hearing, denied his
claim. Mr. Kent then took the case to the Supreme Court.
The Court sustained the Industrial Commission's decision.
At pages 384 and 385 of the Court's opinion is found the
following language :
"When the Industrial Commission denies compensation and the case is brought to this court for
review, a different type of search of the record is
demanded than when the Industrial Commission
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makes an award of compensation and the record is
likewise brought here for review.
"In the case of denial of compensation, the record must disclose that there is material, substantial,
competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to
make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a
matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or
unreasonably refused to believe such evidence. See
Kavalinakis vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 174,
246 P. 698, and Gagos vs. Industrial Commission,
87 Utah 101, 48 P. (2d) 449, 450.
"In case of an award of compensation, all the
record is required to disclose is that there is sufficient, competent, material evidence in the record to
support the award. That there is a conflict in the
evidence, or that this court might or would have
found differently had the evidence been submitted
to it as a trier of the facts, is of no consequence. The
Industrial Commission is a fact-finding body, and
in case there is any substantial evidence to support
its findings, its findings are conclusive upon this
court and may not be distributed. Utah-Idaho Central R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 490,
267 P. 785."
We also do not understand why plaintiff's attorneys
cited the case of Miner vs. Ind. Comm., 202 Pac. (2nd) 557,
115 Utah 88, at page 13 of their brief. Practically all of
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Miner case is contrary
to the position of plaintiff's attorneys. At page 91 of the
Utah citation the Court said
"Once a decision has been rendered against an
applicant on an issue of fact, his right to a rehearing
for the production of further evidence is within the
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discretion of the Commission. Ordinarily the Commission does not abuse its discretion when it refuses
to open up a case for the taking of further evidence,
particularly when the tendered evidence would not
compel a contrary finding."
Plaintiff's attorneys' brief (page 12) refers to the case
of Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 Pac. (2nd) 708,
and quotes a sentence from the Supreme Court's opinion,
relating to a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial.
We doubt that this Court is now ready to hold that all
rules relating to motion for new trial in District Court cases
shall apply to the Industrial Commission's action relating
to applications for rehearings. Regardless of that point,
we call the Court's attention to a sentence preceding the
sentence quoted by plaintiff's attorneys at 89 Utah 380, to
wit
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered testimony on that point appearing from affidavits in
support of the motion for a new trial to be apparently reliable, when it appears that the movant for
the new trial was not guilty of indiligence in failing
to obtain the witness for the trial, and there is no
element of holding such witness in reserve for purposes of obtaining a new trial-generally picturesquely denominated in slang phraseology as "an
ace in the hole"-and it appears likely that such
evidence would change the result, a new trial should
be granted."

Morgan vs. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 82 L. Ed. 1129,
was cited by plaintiff's attorneys at page 15 of their brief.
An examination of the questions decided by the United
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States Supreme Court in that case, shows very little similarity to the points involved in the case at bar. Syllabus
number 2 of the Morgan case discloses the type of question
therein involved:
"2. The 'full hearing' upon which the Packers
and Stockyards Act conditions the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to fix maximum rates to be
charged by market agencies at stockyards requires
that the agencies under investigation be fairly advised of what the government proposes and be heard
upon its proposals before it issues its final command,
even where the proceeding is not of an adversary
character but is initiated as a general inquiry."
CONCLUSION
Neither we nor the members of the Industrial Commission receive any personal pleasure in being required to
refuse or oppose the request of a seriously injured man for
financial assistance. The Legislature enacted the Workmen's Compensation Act, providing for financial benefits
to covered employees under specified circumstances. Regardless of how generous the Industrial Commissioners or
any others may feel, they cannot legally go beyond the limitations set by the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons the Decision and Order of
the Industrial Commission should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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